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THE ARMY PREPOSITIONING STOCKS PROGRAM: "ARE WE THERE YET?"
"We are more and more an expeditionary force; strategic air and sealift, complemented by our pre-positioning initiatives, must be our number one priority."
General John M. Shalikashvili This study revealed that neither our current nor our future ability to strategically project power proved adequate to meet the demands of the 1992 National Security Strategy. 1 To address the MRS, the Army initiated the Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP), which called for prepositioning equipment and Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) unit's onboard ships in the Indian Ocean so they could be delivered to either the Persian Gulf or the Korean Peninsula within 15 days. Surge sealift ships would transport heavy divisions from the continental United States to reinforce operations within 30 days. The ASMP validated the need for additional sealift and preposition afloat ships, the C-17 cargo aircraft, and upgrades of all CONUS-based elements necessary to move forces to air and seaports. Complementing overseas presence, power projection enables U.S. forces to apply all necessary elements of national power at the place and time necessary to achieve national security objectives. Credible power projection requires the capability to rapidly deploy military forces sufficiently robust to prosecute and terminate conflicts on terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies. 
ARMY PREPOSITIONING STOCKS (APS) BEGINNINGS: EVOLUTION FROM THE EARLY YEARS
The APS Program was designed partially in response to events at the conclusion of the Cold War. The end of the U. S. -Soviet conflict led to a downsizing in U.S. military personnel, along with a policy to keep more American troops at home. Still, with regional conflicts on the horizon, Army leaders wanted a way to quickly deploy forces and equipment to meet emerging crisis. At the same time, the U.S. has undertaken a multitude of peacekeeping and humanitarian missions around the world. To accomplish these varied missions, the Army has become increasingly CONUS-based but with greater power projection capabilities.
Operation Desert Storm in 1991 demonstrated the value of prepositioned equipment as well as its challenges. The Army moved large quantities of equipment from Europe and ammunition stocks from three ships into the Gulf, but there was no clear chain of command to approve the transfers from one region to another. Often the issue was left to the discretion of regional commanders. One of the major lessons learned from this experience was the need to preposition equipment to support the deployment of heavy forces. Following the Gulf War, the JCS, concerned about the long time it took to deliver heavy forces and associated logistical support, concluded that "limitations in mobility forces had imposed considerable risk."
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POWER PROJECTION STRATEGY
The only viable alternative to our current strategy of power projection is extensive forward deployment. We can never know with certainty where or when the next conflict will occur or who our next adversary will be. 6 The strategic environment makes it unclear where, or when, or for what strategic purposes U.S. ground forces will find themselves committed to battle in the coming decades. 7 Our current doctrine is based on the initial strategic mobility requirements specified in the 1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review. It calls for placing the lead Brigade on the ground by C+4, the lead Division by C+12, two heavy Divisions by C+30, and the full Corps (five Divisions and a COSCOM) by C+75. The success of our power projection strategy depends on not just the speed with which combat power can be assembled, but also on how quickly it can be deployed on the battlefield. All large scale deployments consist of three distinct and interrelated segments: fort to port, port to port, and port to foxhole.
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The Army has designated CONUS bases from which assigned forces deploy as "Power Projection Platforms." These key bases are equipped with expanded and modernized loading and cargo handling facilities for rapid transport of military forces and equipment to designated ports of embarkation. These modern power projection platforms enable our strategic mobility triad of (strategic airlift, strategic sealift, and prepositioned equipment) to operate at peak efficiency. The strategic mobility triad provides the capability to meet force projection timelines.
Historically, 10 percent of material sent to a theater arrives via airlift, while the remaining 90 percent arrives via sealift. 9 There are two types of prepositioning in the triad: prepositioning ashore (APS-1/2/4/5) and prepositioning afloat (APS-3). Prepositioning plays a critical role in rapidly equipping forces deploying to major theaters of war and to smaller scale contingencies. Prepositioning ashore allows heavy equipment to be kept in-theater, near the point at which it will be needed. 10 Prepositioning afloat allows for forward prepositioning of sustainment stocks, unit equipment, and port opening capabilities on Military Sealift Command (MSC) vessels based in Diego Garcia and Guam. These vessels can cruise worldwide in response to any contingency. Together, these assets enhance force projection by allowing CONUS-deployed personnel to be equipped with in-theater stockpiles, which reduce the need for heavy-lift assets during the critical "Early Entry" phase.
AIRLIFT
Airlift can move forces rapidly from CONUS to any theater, but it is an expensive and inefficient means of moving bulk goods and heavy equipment. It is best suited for the transport of light, early-entry forces, or for the movement of troops falling in on prepositioned stocks or equipment transported by sea. 
APS-2 -EUROPE/Central Region 1 (Land):
A sub-element of APS that consists of force projection packages for two Armored
Battalions and one Infantry Battalion (Mech) stored in unit sets to reduce force deployment time.
The operation is based on the concept of airlifting personnel from an Army heavy brigade and its support elements into a theater to link-up with its equipment and supplies at the Prepoistioned land site.
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APS-2 -EUROPE/Central Region 2 (Land):
The operation is based on the concept of airlifting personnel from an Army heavy brigade and its support elements into a theater to link-up with its equipment and supplies at the prepositioned land site.
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APS-2 -EUROPE/ITALY (Land):
A sub-element of APS that consists of two Armored Battalions and two Infantry Battalion 
APS-4 -KOREA (Land):
The operation is based on the concept of airlifting personnel from an Army heavy Brigade and its support elements into a theater to link-up with its equipment and supplies at the prepositioned land site.
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APS-5 -SOUTHWEST Asia/Qatar (Land):
Battalions and two Infantry Battalion (Mech) stored in unit sets to reduce force deployment time.
The operation is based on the concept of airlifting personnel from the Army heavy Brigade and its support elements into a theater to link-up with its equipment and supplies at the prepositioned land site.
APS-5 -SOUTHWEST Asia/Kuwait (Land):
A sub-element of APS that consists of force projection packages for two Armored Battalions and two Infantry Battalion (Mech) stored in unit sets to reduce force deployment time.
The operation is based on the concept of airlifting personnel from an Army heavy Brigade and its support elements into a theater to link-up with its equipment and supplies at eh Prepositioned land site. 
FIGURE 1. (APS-5) PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT AT CAMP DOHA, KUWAIT
The importance of prepositioned stocks was dramatically illustrated during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). As they faced some challenges early in the operation, the Army and Marine
Corps relied heavily on prepositioned combat equipment and supplies to decisively defeat the Iraqi military. OIF demonstrated that prepositioned stocks could successfully support major combat operations. 24 In their planning, Marines view prepositioned stocks as their "go-to-war" gear, which minimizes surprises or last-minute adjustments. The Marines also train with their gear periodically. By contrast, the Army does not designate the sets for any particular unit and provides little training with the equipment, especially with the afloat stocks. Personnel who used and managed the equipment agreed that the tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and howitzers were in good condition when they were drawn from the prepositioned stocks; moreover, the equipment generally stayed operational throughout the fight. 25 Additionally, combat personnel reported that their prepositioned equipment, in many cases, worked better than what they had at home station.
Moreover, review of operational readiness data showed that major combat equipment stayed operational, even in heavy combat across hundreds of miles. Officials from both services agreed that OIF validated the prepositioning concept and showed that it can successfully support major combat operations. Moreover, the U.S. Central Command, in an internal lessons-learned effort, concluded that prepositioned stocks "proved their worth and were critical in successfully executing OIF."
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ISSUES FACING THE PREPOSITIONING PROGRAM
NEAR TERM ISSUES
DOD faces many issues as it rebuilds its prepositioning program and plans for supporting the transformed military. Additionally, DOD faces fundamental issues as it plans the future of its prepositioning programs. As it reconstitutes the program, the Army must give priority to measures that address long-standing problems, mitigate near-term risk, and shore up readiness in key parts of its prepositioning program. These include:
• Ensuring that it has adequate equipment and spare parts and sustainment supplies in its prepositioning programs, giving priority to afloat and Korea stocks; • Selectively modernizing equipment so that it will match unit equipment and better meet operational needs; and • Planning and conducting training to practice drawing and using prepositioned stocks, especially afloat stocks. 27 Based on some contrasts in the experiences between the Army and the Marine Corps with their prepositioned equipment and supplies in OIF, benefits could be gained by establishing a closer relationship between operational units and the prepositioned stocks they would use in a contingency. The Marines practice with their stocks; the Army could likewise benefit from training on how to unload, prepare, and support prepositioned stocks, particularly afloat stocks.
LONG TERM ISSUES
The long-term issues transcend Army and Marines capabilities; they demand a coordinated effort by the DOD. Three main areas should guide the effort.
• Determine the role of prepositioning in light of the efforts to transform the military. Perhaps it is time for DOD to go back to the drawing board and ask:
What is the military trying to achieve with these stocks? How do they fit into future operational plans? If, as indicated in Desert Storm and OIF, prepositioning continues to play an important part in meeting future military commitments, priority is needed for prepositioning as a part of transformation planning in the future.
• Establish sound prepositioning requirements that support joint expeditionary forces. If DOD decides that prepositioning will continue to play an important role in supporting future combat operations, establishing sound, fully integrated requirements is critical. The Department is beginning to rethink what capabilities could be needed.
The Army and Marines are pursuing sea-basing ideas where prepositioning ships could serve as offshore logistics bases. The RAND Corporation recently published a report suggesting that the military consider prepositioning support equipment to help the Stryker brigade meet deployment timelines. 28 Such support equipment constitutes much of the weight and volume of the brigade, but a relatively small part of the costs compared to the costs of combat systems.
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• Ensure that the program is resourced commensurate with its priority and that it is affordable even as the force is transformed. DOD must consider affordability. In the past, the drawdown of Army forces made prepositioning a practical alternative because it provided extra equipment. However, as the services' equipment is transformed and recapitalized, it may not be practical to buy enough equipment for units at home station and for prepositioning. Stocks are prepositioned to reduce response times and enable forces to meet the demands of the full spectrum, of military operations.
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ARMY PREPOSITIONING (FUTURE)
Prepositioning equipment and materiel has been a key element of the Army's Strategic Mobility Triad for many years. It has been an essential component of our ability to meet the demands of our NMS. Even so the strategic mobility of the Army is constrained. This limitation is represented in terms of weight/cube and time/distance: The weight/cube of Army forces exceeds the capability of available strategic airlift to meet deployment goals. 31 The time required to move Army forces vast distances by sea from CONUS exceeds the acceptable force closure times for early deploying forces. 32 The APS Program has served a useful purpose in mitigating this mobility dilemma.
However, as the Army progresses with the Transformation process, the nature of this mobility dilemma is changing significantly. As a result, the Army must adapt its prepositioning strategy to effectively deal with these changes. The current status of APS assets is jeopardized by shortages in equipment fill, minor planned modernizations of equipment, and increasingly more • Evolve to meet the requirements for the current and projected security environment.
• Improve the national capability to respond to GWOT requirements.
• Change in concert with DOD and Joint Transformation
• Redress known limitations within current P2 capabilities
• Deliver combined arms combat power within an adaptive, prompt, and sustained framework to meet joint force requirements in terms of time, quantity, and quality.
This draft document further states that prepositioning will continue to be a valuable element of Power Projection. 34 However, in order to maximize its effectiveness, an adjustable prepositiioning strategy has to be developed to complement the evolving Army Transformation.
In light of this, a prevailing underpinning for the strategy has emerged: The composition of prepositioned assets should include more CS/CSS equipment and sustainment materiel (including Configured Loads). While eliminating heavy combat equipment does not seem like a viable alternative for the near term, there is clearly merit in pre-positioning more CS/CSS equipment.
A simple comparison between the expected life cycle and utility of combat equipment verses CS/CSS equipment over the next 15 to 20 years highlights the fact that fielding status of combat systems (AOE, FXXI, Stryker, and FCS) will experience significant turbulence, while CS/CSS equipment will remain relatively stable and constant. 35 This is a vital strategic consideration.
Other supporting factors for this strategic alternative include:
• Theater opening and distribution assets are critically needed early in a conflict (unknown geographical threat).
• Pre-positioning CS/CSS assets would significantly mitigate the risk of an operational pause between prompt response and sustained operations.
• Improved strategic mobility of future combat systems is a required performance parameter, which eliminates the need to preposition.
• Reducing the CS/CSS claims on Strategic Lift, increases the lift availability for combat systems and forces.
• Common CS/CSS equipment will be used increasingly for operations across the spectrum of operations (e.g. Humanitarian Ops, SSC, and MCO).
• Value and maintenance requirements are less costly for CS/CSS equipment than for combat systems.
• CS/CSS equipment is less subject to the rapid pace of technological change, thus, it requires less modernization over time. 
